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Fundamental Rights and European IP Law – the case of Art 17(2) of the EU Charter 
 
 
Jonathan Griffiths and Luke McDonagh 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There is a large and ever-growing literature on the relationship between fundamental rights 
and intellectual property law.
1
 Particular attention has been devoted to a number of specific 
issues. These include the impact of the rights to health, medicine and life on patent law,
2
 the 
potential conflict between freedom of expression and the laws of copyright and trade marks
3
 
and the privacy implications of intellectual property remedies and sanctions.
4
 These issues, 
amongst others, have been explored in a range of national and international legal contexts. 
However, the role of fundamental rights within European Union (EU) intellectual property 
law has not yet been fully explored.
5
 It is, nevertheless, likely to become a subject of 
increasing significance. Following the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EU bodies 
have clear obligations to take fundamental rights into consideration in all their activities.
6
 
                                                            
1 See for example, C Geiger, ‘“Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental 
Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union’ [2006] International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law 371; T Mylly, Intellectual Property and European Economic Constitutional Law (Vaajakoski, 
Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, 2009); J Cornides, ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Conflict or 
Convergence?’ [2004] Journal of World Intellectual Property 1423; P Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property & 
Human Rights (Kluwer, 2008); L Helfer and G Austin, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping the 
Global Interface (CUP, 2011); D Matthews, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Development, The Role of 
NGOs and Social Movements (Edward Elgar, 2011); W Grosheide (ed), Intellectual Property Rights and Human 
Rights: A Paradox (Edward Elgar, 2009).
2 See D Matthews, ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights and the Right to Health’ in W Grosheide (ed), 
Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: A Paradox (Edward Elgar, 2009); H Hestermeyer, Human 
Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines (OUP, 2007); D Matthews, Intellectual 
Property, Human Rights and Development, The Role of NGOs and Social Movements (Edward Elgar, 2011). 
3 NW Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (OUP, 2008); J Griffiths & U Suthersanen, Copyright & Free Speech 
(OUP, 2005); C Geiger, ‘Trade Marks & Freedom of Expression – the Proportionality of Criticism’ [2007] IIC 
317; J Griffiths, ‘Is there a Right to an Immoral Trade Mark?’ in P Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property & 
Human Rights (Kluwer, 2008), 309; Laugh it Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International 
(Finance) BV [2005] ZACC 7; [2005] BCLR 743 (Constitutional Court, South Africa); Alles Wird Teurer 
[1999] ETMR 49 (KG Berlin Court of Appeal); Sté Gervais Danone v Société Le Riseau Voltaire, Société 
Gandhi, Valentin Lacambre [2003] ETMR 321; Association Greenpeace France v SA Société Esso [2003] 
ETMR 867 (Cour d’appel de Paris); SA Société des Participations du CEA v Greenpeace France et al [2003] 
ETMR 870 (Cour d’appel de Paris). 
4 See, for example, S Catal, ‘Privacy v Piracy,’ Yale Journal of Law and Technology 7 (2004), 222; J Griffiths, 
‘Criminal Liability for Intellectual Property Infringement in Europe – the Role of Fundamental Rights,’ in C 
Geiger (ed), Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property: A Blessing or a Curse? (Edward Elgar, 2011). See 
also Scarlet Extended SA v Société Belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs (SABAM) (C-70/10) (AG Cruz 
Villalón), Opinion of 14 April 2011. 
5 Although, see C Geiger, “Copyright’s Fundamental Rights Dimension at EU level” in E Derclaye (ed), 
Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright (Edward Elgar, 2009) 27; T Mylly, Intellectual Property 
and European Economic Constitutional Law (Vaajakoski, Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, 2009). 
6 For a thorough assessment of the application of the EU Charter post-Lisbon, see P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: 
Law Politics, and Treaty Reform (OUP, 2010). See also S Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 3rd ed 
(OUP, 2011). For a general assessment of fundamental rights in an EU context see P Craig and G De Burca, EU 
Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 4th ed (OUP, 2007) 379-427. See also D Ehlers (ed), European Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms (De Gruyter Recht, 2007) and T Ahmed and I de Jesús Butler, ‘The European Union and 
Human Rights: An International Law Perspective,’ [2006] European Journal of International Law 771. For an 
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Under Art 6(1) of the Treaty of European Union (TEU), rights granted under the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU (“the EU Charter”)
7
 have the same legal value as those 
established under the foundational treaties. Furthermore, under Art 6(3) TEU: 
 
‘Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the 
union’s law.’
8
     
 
In such circumstances, a fundamental rights dimension applies to all areas of law within the 
EU’s competence, which clearly includes most areas of intellectual property law. The 
obligation to comply with fundamental norms applies not only to the EU legislature, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union and other EU bodies, but also to national institutions 
when acting within the sphere of EU competence. 
 
The enhanced status of the rules and jurisprudence of fundamental rights law under the 
Lisbon arrangements is likely to have an impact in a number of different areas of intellectual 
property law. However, in this chapter, we intend to focus on only one particularly interesting 
aspect of the relationship between these two bodies of law. Art 17(2) of the EU Charter 
grants intellectual property itself a fundamental status, providing that: 
 
‘Intellectual property shall be protected.’ 
 
The intention and effect of this provision are uncertain.
9
 Nevertheless, it has already been 
referred to on a number of occasions within the EU’s intellectual property system. In this 
chapter, we seek to address some of the uncertainty concerning the aim and scope of Art 
17(2) by exploring the interpretation of its historical antecedents. In so doing, we hope to 
dispel a number of misconceived claims that have been made about its supposed effects.     
 
 
Fundamental Rights in EU Intellectual Property Law  
 
Even prior to the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the relevance of fundamental rights 
to intellectual property law had been acknowledged by the institutions of the EU. 
Fundamental rights have, for example, been advanced as justification for legislative activity 
on a number of occasions. In the Information Society Directive, it was claimed that:
10
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
early example of the impact of the EU Charter in intellectual property law, see Scarlet Extended SA v Société 
Belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs (SABAM) (C-70/10) (AG Cruz Villalón); Opinion of 14 April 2011. 
7 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as signed and proclaimed by the Presidents of the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission at the European Council meeting in Nice on 7 December 2000. 
8 The EU is itself under an obligation to accede to the ECHR as a result of Article 6(2) Treaty on European 
Union (‘TEU’), original treaty signed at Maastricht, 7 February 1992, and amended by the Treaty of Lisbon 
amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at 
Lisbon, 13 December 2007, entered into force on 1 December 2009. The Council of Europe introduced Protocol 
No. 14 ECHR (entered into force 1 June 2010) in order to allow the EU to become a party to the ECHR. 
9 See C Geiger, ‘Intellectual Property Shall be Protected!? – Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union: a Mysterious Provision with an Unclear Scope’ [2009] European Intellectual Property 
Review 115. 
10 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ L 167, 22.06.2001). 
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‘The proposed harmonisation will help to implement the four freedoms of the internal 
market and relates to compliance with the fundamental principles of law and 
especially of property, including intellectual property, and freedom of expression and 
the public interest.’
11
 
In patent law, the recitals to the Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions make a similar claim: 
 
‘Whereas pursuant to…the Treaty on European Union, the Union is to respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and 
as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community law.’
12
 
The Enforcement Directive is also presented as serving goals grounded in respect for 
fundamental rights: 
 
‘This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised 
in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In 
particular, this Directive seeks to ensure full respect for intellectual property, in 
accordance with Article 17(2) of that Charter.’
13
  
 
On occasion, such assertions of compatibility with fundamental rights norms have also been 
tested before the EU courts in the context of intellectual property law. Notably, for example, 
it was argued in The Netherlands v European Parliament and EU Council14 that the 
fundamental right to human dignity was infringed by the Directive on biotechnological 
inventions. The Netherlands, supported by Norway and Italy, argued that the patenting of any 
invention derived from human DNA constituted an affront to the fundamental right to human 
dignity and integrity because it envisaged using the human body as a ‘means to an end’. The 
ECJ rejected this assessment, noting that Article 5(1) of the Directive clearly states that the 
human body cannot constitute a patentable invention during its various stages of formation 
and development. Furthermore, no element of the human body is patentable of itself; 
inventions are only patentable when they combine a natural element with a technical process 
with the purpose of undertaking an industrial application.  
 
In copyright law, the Court of Justice has also heard challenges to the compatibility of EU 
legislation with fundamental norms. In Laserdisken,15 the validity of Art 4(2) of the 
Information Society Directive was questioned by the proprietor of a business selling copies of 
cinematographic works, who argued that it violated the right to freedom of expression 
protected under Art 10 of the ECHR.
16
 In particular, it was claimed that the public’s right of 
access to information, a right falling within the ambit of Art 10, was breached by Art 4(2)’s 
                                                            
11 Ibid, recital 3. 
12 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions, (OJ L 213, 30.7.1998), recital 43. See also recital 16. 
13 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights (OJ L 157, 30.4.2004), recital 32. 
14 C-377/98 [2001] 3 CMLR 49. 
15 C-479/04 [2007] 1 CMLR 6. 
16 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 
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prohibition of national rules providing for ‘international exhaustion of rights’ in the case of 
copyright and related rights. In rejecting the challenge, the ECJ held that, even if Art 4(2) 
were to be regarded as an interference with the right established under Art 10(1) ECHR, its 
effects were justified by the need to protect intellectual property. 
 
As demonstrated by these two cases, frontal challenges to the compatibility of intellectual 
property legislation with the norms of fundamental rights law have not been successful in the 
Court of Justice. Nevertheless, the Court has confirmed that EU legislation must be 
interpreted in a manner that secures effective protection for fundamental rights. This was 
made clear in the judgment in Promusicae,17 which concerned a national application for an 
order requiring an ISP to disclose the identity of clients engaged in unlawful file-sharing. The 
Court held that, in the absence of specific EU rules, national courts or other relevant 
authorities are obliged to arrive at a ‘fair balance’ between the rights to privacy of the ISP’s 
customers on the one hand and the right-holders’ rights to property and to an effective 
remedy on the other. Similar fundamental rights constraints have also been noted in relation 
to copyright exceptions in Stichting de Thuiskopie v van der Lee18 and, in trade mark law, in 
proceedings concerning the attempted registration of “immoral” marks at OHIM.
19
 
 
Examining Article 17(2) 
 
As noted above, the meaning of Article 17(2)’s short instruction that “intellectual property 
shall be protected” is far from certain. Commentators have noted that the phrasing of the 
English version of the provision differs subtly from that in other languages.
 20
 For example, 
in French, Art 17(2) states that ‘La propriété intellectuelle est protégée’ and the German 
version declares that ‘Geistiges Eigentum wird geschützt’. These could be translated as 
“intellectual property is protected”, rather than as ‘intellectual property shall be protected’. 
Such ambiguities of translation serve only to heighten the mystery surrounding the provision. 
How then are we to understand its intended effect? One possible interpretation, which seems 
to accord closely with the French and German versions, would be that Art 17(2) simply 
declares, as a matter of fact, that intellectual property is protected within the EU and, perhaps, 
that such protection serves to promote the fundamental norms embodied in the Charter. 
However, such a purely descriptive reading seems unlikely. Art 17(2), after all, is to be found 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, a constitutional document of declaratory and 
aspirational significance. Such a factual and descriptive interpretation would be out of place 
in that context. At the opposite end of the spectrum of potential meanings, Art 17(2) may be 
argued to be the constitutional expression of a maximalist approach to intellectual property. 
As such, could it perhaps be intended to require EU bodies, and national authorities acting 
within the scope of EU law, to accord intellectual property the highest possible degree of 
                                                            
17 Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU (C-275/06) [2008] ECR I-271. 
See now also Scarlet Extended SA v Société Belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs (SABAM) (C-70/10) 
(AG Cruz Villalón); Opinion of 14 April 2011. 
18 Stichting de Thuiskopie v van der Lee (C-462/09), Opinion, 10 March 2011(AG Jääskinen) and Judgment of 
the Court, 16 June 2011 (as yet unreported). In particular, the judgment notes that: ‘A ‘fair balance’ must be 
maintained between the rights and interests of the authors, who are to receive the fair compensation, on one 
hand, and those of the users of protected works, on the other’ [25]. 
19 See, for example, Application of Kenneth (trading as Screw You) [2007] ETMR 7 (OHIM, Grand Board).  
20 See C Geiger, ‘Intellectual Property Shall be Protected!? – Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union: a Mysterious Provision with an Unclear Scope’ [2009] European Intellectual Property 
Review 115; A Peukert, ‘Intellectual Property as an End in Itself?’ [2011] European Intellectual Property 
Review 67, 68-70. 
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protection at all times? Some right-holder organisations would undoubtedly find such an 
interpretation appealing. However, in reality, it is just as implausible as the purely descriptive 
reading canvassed above. EU intellectual property law is a complex body of rules under 
which the interests of right-holders give way to public and third party interests in a variety of 
ways. The EU institutions have shown an increasing urge to introduce flexibility within the 
framework of intellectual property law. Against such a background, the enigmatic formula of 
Art 17(2) surely cannot have been intended to form the basis for a radical disruption of this 
settled balance or for a system under which the policy options available to EU law-makers 
are radically curtailed.   
 
A more plausible interpretation has been advanced by Geiger, who suggests that Art 17(2) 
should be read as confirmation that intellectual property is a form of property covered by Art 
17(1)’s general property guarantee.
21
 There are a number of reasons for believing this 
interpretation to be correct. First, it makes sense of the overall structure of Art 17, under 
which Art 17(2) is subservient to the more generally worded Art 17(1). Secondly, as is the 
case with other provisions in the Charter, it would give explicit recognition to the 
interpretation of the equivalent Article in the Charter’s predecessor, the ECHR, by the 
European Court of Human Rights. As discussed further below, that Court has, on a number of 
occasions, confirmed that intellectual property is a form of property that is covered by the 
right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
 22
 If this interpretation is correct, the text of Art 
17(1) is clearly crucial to the determination of the meaning and scope of Art 17(2). Art 17(1) 
provides that: 
 
‘Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully 
acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the 
public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject 
to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may 
be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.’ 
 
This right establishes a number of related guarantees (including, for example, guarantees 
against deprivation and use) and sets out the conditions under which interferences with 
lawfully acquired possessions are permissible. Cases involving deprivation of ‘possessions’ 
are only permitted where, inter alia, compensation is paid. Simple use of ‘possessions’, 
however, may be ‘regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest’. 
 
Art 17(1) has its historical origin in Art 1, Protocol 1 of the ECHR and in the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights on that provision.
23
 Art 1, Protocol 1 provides that: 
 
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possession except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
 The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a 
state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
                                                            
21 See C Geiger, ‘Intellectual Property Shall be Protected!? – Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union: a Mysterious Provision with an Unclear Scope,’ [2009] European Intellectual Property 
Review 115. 
22 See cases discussed below. See also Smith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd v the Netherlands (1990) 66 
DR 70, 79 (European Commission of HR); Melnychuk v Ukraine (2006) 42 EHRR 42. 
23 Note, for example the explicit reference to the general requirement to pay compensation in the case of 
deprivation of possessions. See Lithgow v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 324. 
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accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contribution or penalties.’ 
  
There are differences between the two provisions. Art 17(1) offers a more general, idealised 
form of protection and omits some of the specific detail to be found in Art 1, Protocol 1.
24
 
Nevertheless, there are close similarities in overall structure. Both Articles apply to 
‘possessions’ and permit interferences with the enjoyment of those possessions in ‘the 
general interest’. Similarly, both provisions have a sliding scale of impact – with right-
holders appearing to be protected more strongly against deprivation of possessions than 
simple use of possessions.     
 
Given this historical relationship and these similarities of structure, it can be assumed that the 
extensive jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the application of Art 1, 
Protocol 1 will be relevant to the interpretation of Art 17(1) of the Charter and, in so far as 
the Charter’s property guarantee applies to intellectual property, to the interpretation of Art 
17(2). The Charter and the ECHR have different functions. As applied to EU institutions, the 
Charter is a constitutional document and has the potential to have direct impact in 
proceedings between private parties. The ECHR, by contrast, is an international treaty and 
binds directly only state parties. Nevertheless, this structural distinction ought not to affect 
the interpretation of core concepts shared by both property guarantees, including 
‘possessions’, ‘the general interest’, ‘deprivation’ and ‘use’.  The concept of the ‘margin of 
appreciation’, which has played a significant role in the Strasbourg jurisprudence on Art 1, 
Protocol 1, will undoubtedly have diminished relevance within the EU legal system. 
Nevertheless, the European Court of Human Rights’ reasons for according a broad zone of 
discretion will apply equally under EU law. Legislatures and executive bodies will generally 
be in a better position than courts to identify the appropriate balance between private property 
rights and other complex social interests in particular cases. It can therefore reasonably be 
supposed that an understanding of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence on 
Art 1, Protocol 1 can continue to provide valuable help in resolving some of the current 
uncertainty concerning the meaning and scope of Art 17(2). Accordingly, it is to this 
jurisprudence that we now turn.       
 
 
Examining the meaning of Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has settled the limits of the right to peaceful enjoyment 
of property in a number of important respects.
 25
 Article 1, Protocol 1 states that: 
 
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. 
                                                            
24 See, for example, the specific references to international law and to the payment of taxes in Art 1, Protocol 1, 
ECHR. 
25 For an examination of the case law on this right, see A van Rijn, ‘Right to the Peaceful Enjoyment of One’s 
Possessions,’ in P van Dijk, F Van Hoof, A Van Rijn and L Zwaak (eds), Theory and Practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 4th ed (Intersentia Publishers, 2006) 863; DJ Harris et al, Harris, O’Boyle & 
Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd ed (OUP, 2009) 655. 
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The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a 
state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties.’ 
  
The Strasbourg Court has confirmed that this Article establishes three related rights - the 
general right to the peaceful enjoyment of property and the specific rights against deprivation 
of property and against the regulation of the use of property.
 26
 The first element, the right to 
the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, is of a general nature and may come into play in cases 
in which there is no deprivation or control of the use of property, but where the enjoyment of 
the property is nonetheless interfered with.
27
 For instance, in the case of Sporrong and 
Lönnroth v Sweden, expropriation permits were issued by the state in relation to a number of 
privately owned properties in central Stockholm in expectation of urban development. The 
existence of the expropriation permits meant that the properties were much less attractive for 
buyers than they would have otherwise been. The Court found that, as the owners remained 
free to sell or dispose of the property, there had been no deprivation of property in 
accordance with the second element. However, the right to peaceful enjoyment of property 
under the first sentence of the first paragraph was relevant because the owners’ peaceful 
enjoyment of the property had been disrupted. The right not to be deprived of property under 
the second sentence of the first paragraph of the Article  will be applicable where there has 
been a formal transfer of ownership
28
 or where de facto expropriation has taken place.
29
 
Typical examples of the regulation of a property’s use under the second paragraph of the 
Article are provided by the exercise of planning restrictions
30
, rent control powers
31
 or 
powers of taxation.
32
  
 
The concept of ‘possessions’ under Art 1, Protocol 1 has also been interpreted by the Court, 
which has confirmed that the protected rights apply only to ‘existing possessions’. These 
include rights arising by virtue of legitimate expectations (such as the legitimate expectation 
that proper administrative procedures will be followed).
33
 An example of a case in which 
legitimate expectations were protected is provided by Pressos Compania Naviera SA v 
Belgium. Following a number of shipping accidents involving the alleged negligence of state 
employees, the Belgian state enacted specific legislation to prevent tort claims from being 
brought in relation to losses incurred by private individuals. The Court held that the failure to 
                                                            
26 The three factors were first identified by the European Court of Human Rights in Sporrong and Lönnroth v 
Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 85. For discussion of the Article’s structure, see DJ Harris et al, Harris, O’Boyle & 
Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd ed (OUP, 2009) 666-672.  
27 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 85. See also Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v  
Greece (1994) 19 EHRR 293. 
28 See, for example, The Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece (2001) 33 EHRR 21, in which a formal 
transfer of property from a natural person to the state was held to breach Art 1, Protocol 1. 
29 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden [1982] 5 EHRR 85. In this case, the Court found that, because the owners 
were nonetheless free to sell or dispose of the property, there had been no formal or de facto expropriation of 
property. On the other hand, in Papamichalopoulos v Greece (1993) 16 EHRR 440, the Court found that there 
was a de facto expropriation of property amounting to deprivation under Art 1, Protocol 1. In 
Papamichalopoulos, the property in question comprised of a piece of land formally owned by the applicants but 
upon which the Greek navy had constructed a naval base. The title in the property remained with the applicants 
but due to the actions of the state it was held that the applicants’ rights under the second aspect of Article 1, 
Protocol 1 had been breached. See also Brumarescu v Romania (2001) 33 EHRR 36. 
30 Pine Valley Developments Ltd v Ireland (1991) 14 EHRR 319. 
31 Mellacher v Austria (1989) 12 EHRR 391. 
32 Gasus Dosier- und Fordertechnik v the Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403. 
33 Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330. See also Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal (2007) 45 EHRR 36. 
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fulfil the prior existing legitimate expectation that a claim in tort would be possible 
constituted an interference with the applicant’s rights under Art 1, Protocol 1.
34
 In Pine 
Valley Developments Ltd v Ireland35 the case concerned an applicant who had purchased a 
plot of land for which planning permission for industrial development had been granted. 
However, subsequent to the purchase of the land, the Irish Supreme Court upheld a decision 
that the grant of planning permission had been illegal and as a result had been void ab initio. 
The Strasbourg Court held that because the applicant was entitled to rely on the legitimate 
expectation that planning permission had been granted, there had been an interference with 
the applicant’s rights under Art 1, Protocol 1. 
 
Art 1, Protocol 1 does not, however, cover claims to be entitled to property in future. As 
Harris et al have explained: 
 
‘The Convention protects an applicant’s existing possessions and assets against 
interference. It is not a right to be put into the possession of things one does not 
already have, however strong the individual’s interest in this happening may be.’
36
 
Thus, for example, in Marckx v Belgium,37 the applicant claimed that a national law 
restricting the inheritance rights of children born to unmarried parents breached Art 1, 
Protocol 1. The Court disagreed, holding that the property guarantee under the ECHR does 
not guarantee the right to acquire possessions in future, whether through intestacy or via 
voluntary disposition.
38
  
Whichever of three rights established under this Article is at issue, the Court will apply a ‘fair 
balance’ test in deciding whether an interference with the right can be justified. The 
application of this test requires the public interest and the affected fundamental rights to be 
balanced in proportionate manner.
39
 In investigating this issue, the Court has accorded states 
a considerably wider margin of appreciation than has been permitted in the case of 
interferences with other qualified rights protected under the ECHR. Particular flexibility has 
been shown where the interference at issue can be defined as ‘use’ rather than as total 
deprivation of property. However, even in the case of deprivation, the Court has accepted that 
                                                            
34 Pressos Compania Naviera SA v Belgium (1997) 21 EHRR 301. 
35 Pine Valley Developments Ltd v Ireland (1991) 14 EHRR 319. 
36 DJ Harris et al, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd ed 
(OUP, 2009) 660. 
37 Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330.  
38 See also Inze v Austria (1987) 10 EHRR 394, where an illegitimate child who had already inherited part of an 
estate was able to make arguments based on Article 1, Protocol 1 in relation to other aspects of the inheritance 
because his interest in the estate constituted an “existing possession”. See, however, the case of X v the Federal 
Republic of Germany (1979) 18 DR 170, where the facts concerned a change to the law which reduced the 
amount chargeable as a notary fee. A notary argued that this affected his ability to earn future revenue. The 
Court rejected the argument that he had a ‘possession’ for the purpose of Article 1, Protocol 1. The court stated 
that the mere expectation that the state legal regulations on notary fees would not be reduced could not be 
considered a property right. In Müller v Austria (1975) 3 DR 25 the Court held that a person could claim his or 
her own pension contributions as a ‘possession’ under Article 1, Protocol 1. Furthermore, the Court 
acknowledged that the right may be affected by the way the pension fund is distributed. Nonetheless, the Court 
held that there was no right to claim that any particular amount of final pension payment was guaranteed by Art 
1, Protocol 1. 
39 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 85. In this case it was found that there had been no fair 
balance and therefore that the interference with the right under Art 1, Protocol 1 could not be justified. 
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private property interests may legitimately be regulated in the ‘general interest’.
40
 An 
example of this deference is provided by James v United Kingdom,41 which concerned the 
transfer of privately-owned properties to longstanding tenants at less than market value. The 
United Kingdom argued that this transfer was in accordance with national legislation and was 
in the ‘public interest’ as an attempt to combat social injustice. The Court found that the aim 
of the legislation was reasonable and the means of achieving it were not disproportionate. 
The Court went on to say that it would not intervene, so long as a national authority’s 
assessment of the public interest was not manifestly without reasonable foundation. It also 
noted that, even in the case of a deprivation of property, it would not always be necessary for 
full compensation to be paid. As long as compensation is proportionate, the terms of Article 
1, Protocol 1 will be satisfied. States are also granted a wide margin of appreciation in 
assessing proportionality.
42
 The Court’s willingness to allow extensive leeway to states under 
Art 1, Protocol 1 means that this provision has served predominantly as a guarantee of 
legality and fair procedure, rather than as a strongly entrenched bulwark for private 
property.
43
  
 
 
Intellectual property under Art 1, Protocol 1 
 
The relatively loose standard of review described above has also been apparent in the few 
cases in which the Court has given direct consideration to the application of Art 1, Protocol 1 
to intellectual property.
44
 The case of Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal45 is the most famous of 
these. The proceedings in that case arose from the long-running dispute between the 
American company, Anheuser-Busch Inc, and the Czech brewer, Budějovický Budvar. 
Anheuser-Busch claimed that the Portuguese court had violated Art 1, Protocol 1 in 
upholding the national authority’s refusal to register its application for registration of the 
trade mark, ‘Budweiser’. The decision to refuse the application had been based on the fact 
that Budějovický Budvar owned a registered ‘protected geographical indication’ for 
‘Budweiser Bier’, a registration which the national decision-maker held to take precedence 
over Anheuser-Busch’s trade mark application by virtue of the complex effect of an 
international treaty on domestic law. The Court held that the mere application for trade mark 
registration could qualify as a ‘possession’ for the purposes of Art 1, Protocol 1 and, 
therefore, that Anheuser-Busch’s claim fell within the scope of the protected right. The 
                                                            
40 For discussion of the ‘margin of appreciation’ under the ECHR see Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 
EHRR 737; DJ Harris et al, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
2nd ed (OUP, 2009) 11-14. 
41 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123. See also Scollo v Italy [1995] 22 EHRR 514. 
42 See also AGOSI v United Kingdom (1986) 9 EHRR 1. A further example of a justifiable interference is 
provided by Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v Sweden (1989) 13 EHRR 309, where a licence to serve alcohol at a 
restaurant was withdrawn by the state due following a dispute over taxation issues. The Court decided that while 
a restaurant’s licence to serve alcohol could constitute a possession, there was no interference with the right 
under Article 1, Protocol 1 because the withdrawal of licence was lawful, proportionate and in the general 
interest. 
43 Hentrich v France (1994) 18 EHRR 440. 
44 See cases discussed below. See also Smith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd v the Netherlands (1990) 66 
DR 70, 79 (European Commission of HR); Melnychuk v Ukraine (2006) 42 EHRR 42. For discussion, see L. 
Helfer, ‘The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights’ in P 
Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property & Human Rights (Leiden, Kluwer, 2008) 25; J. Weiss, ‘Commercializing 
Human Rights: Trademarks in Europe After Anheuser-Busch v Portugal,’ [2011] Journal of World Intellectual 
Property 176 and B Goebel, ‘Geographical Indications and Trademarks in Europe,’ 95 Trademark Reporter 
(2005), 1165. 
45 Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal (2007) 45 EHRR 36. 
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application constituted a possession because an applicant had a legitimate expectation that it 
would be handled fairly by national authorities and because there was evidence that such 
applications were, as a matter of fact, tradeable. However, having held that the application 
was covered by the property guarantee, the Court noted that the national court had simply 
interpreted an uncertain aspect in national intellectual property law and it was not the Court’s 
role to review such a determination of the competing claims to entitlement to a mark, stating 
that: 
 
‘…[T]he Court reiterates that its jurisdiction to verify that domestic law has been 
correctly interpreted and applied is limited and that it is not its function to take the 
place of the national courts, its role being rather to ensure that the decisions of those 
courts are not flawed by arbitrariness or otherwise manifestly unreasonable.’
46
 
 
A similar conclusion was reached in Dima v Romania,47 which concerned a design submitted 
to a government-sponsored competition and which was ultimately chosen as an official state 
emblem. The dispute in the national courts centred on the question of who ought to be 
recognised as the ‘author’ of the emblem – Dima, the original creator, or the Romanian 
Parliament, which had commissioned the design. Dima claimed that the use of his creation 
without payment breached his rights under national copyright law. The Romanian Supreme 
Court decided that the Parliament was to be deemed the ‘author’ of the design in such 
circumstances and therefore that no fee was payable. Dima brought a complaint under the 
ECHR, claiming that this decision violated his rights under Art 1, Protocol 1. However, his 
claim was held to be inadmissible.
48
 The national court had simply resolved a dispute about 
the interpretation of the scope of a property right in national law in a manner that was not 
arbitrary and, therefore, it was inappropriate for the Strasbourg Court to intervene.  
 
By contrast, the case of Balan v Moldova49 demonstrates that there are limits to this 
deference in cases in which a state effectively expropriates an intellectual property right. 
Balan concerned a photographer’s work, which had been used by the state without payment 
in the production of national identity cards. The photographer had succeeded in a legal action 
against the state in March 1999 and had been awarded an amount of compensation regarding 
use of the photograph up to that date. However, the state continued to use the applicant’s 
photograph on identity cards until May 2000. The applicant received no further compensation 
for this period of use and the applicant brought proceedings before the national court, seeking 
compensation for the use of his creation by the state on identity cards between March 1999 
and May 2000. The Moldovan Supreme Court refused this claim, holding that the applicant 
was not entitled to compensation for the use of the photograph because he had already 
received compensation resulting from the earlier successful legal action and had not 
requested a prohibition on future use during the earlier action. Balan applied to the European 
Court of Human Rights, claiming that his rights under Art 1, Protocol 1 had been violated. In 
this instance, by contrast with Anheuser-Busch and Dima, the Court found that the 
photographer’s rights had been breached. The national court’s assessment that the applicant 
had tacitly accepted the State’s use of his photograph was untenable. In fact, its application of 
national law appeared not even to have been compatible with the Convention’s conception of 
                                                            
46 Ibid, [83]. 
47 Dima v Romania (58472/00), admissibility decision of 26 May 2005. 
48 A separate procedural complaint under Art 6(1), ECHR was subsequently upheld, see Dima v Romania 
(58472), Judgment of 16th November 2006. 
49 Balan v Moldova (19247/03), Judgment of 29 January 2008.  
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‘lawfulness’. In any event, whether the national court had acted lawfully or not, it had 
interfered with a copyright interest protected under national law disproportionately and 
without justification. Accordingly, it had failed to strike a ‘fair balance’ between the interests 
of the parties to the national proceedings.  
 
 
The true scope of Article 17(2) 
 
Having investigated the case-law on Art 1, Protocol, 1 and having seen that this jurisprudence 
must guide the meaning and scope of Art 17(2) of the Charter, it is now possible to 
investigate the likely impact of Art 17(2) upon EU intellectual property law in greater detail. 
As an initial step, it may be helpful to identify certain situations in which it will not apply. 
There are certain claims to which it will have no relevance at all. As we have seen, Art 17(2) 
regulates interferences with existing possessions only and cannot, therefore, form the basis of 
a claim to property that has no current legally-recognised form. Art 17(2) will not, therefore 
support a claim to be entitled to intellectual property protection where none is currently 
enjoyed. A perfume manufacturer would not, for example, be able to rely upon it in seeking 
to argue that its products were entitled to copyright protection in a jurisdiction which had not 
previously protected perfume under copyright law.  Equally, it will not apply to claims by 
existing right-holders to additional exclusive rights. Thus, for example, proponents of a right 
to control the second-hand trade in legitimately distributed reproductions of copyright works 
would not be able to argue in favour of the introduction of such a right on the basis of Art 
17(2).  
 
A second important limitation on the application of Art 17(2) is provided by the principle that 
legitimate decisions about the boundaries of existing intellectual property rights will not 
violate the property guarantee where they are not unlawful or manifestly disproportionate.
50
 
As a result, for example, a claimant who argues that an exclusion from patentability has been 
wrongly applied to his invention could not rely on Art 17(2). Similarly, a copyright owner 
who disputes the over-broad reading of a copyright exception or limitation by the ECJ, or a 
national court, will not be able to plead Art 17(2) in support of a stricter reading. Finally, the 
fact that, even where an interference with an existing possession is established, extensive 
leeway is permitted for the regulation of property in the general interest will also limit the 
impact of this provision in intellectual property law. 
 
Despite these limitations, it is nevertheless possible to identify situations in which Art 17(2) 
may have an impact in European intellectual property law. One such situation is exemplified 
by the Balan Judgment described above. The fundamental guarantee of the peaceful 
enjoyment of intellectual property rights will prohibit any arbitrary, or manifestly 
disproportionate, refusal to register a claim to an intellectual property right or  to uphold a 
clearly valid claim. This effect of the fundamental right to intellectual property falls very 
close to the core of protection offered by the European property guarantee.
51
 Such violations 
of the basic principles of legality may, at first sight, seem unlikely to occur very often. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the concept of ‘legality’ has been interpreted 
broadly by the Strasbourg Court. Legal regulation must be both reasonably ascertainable and 
                                                            
50 See discussion of Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal (2007) 45 EHRR 36 above. 
51 This will be the case even when that guarantee is interpreted in its narrowest form (a form described by Helfer 
as the ‘rule of law’ paradigm). See L Helfer, ‘The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the 
European Court of Human Rights’ in P Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property & Human Rights (Kluwer, 2008), 
25, 51. 
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reasonably predictable if it is to be entitled to be described as “law” for the purpose of the 
ECHR.
52
 Accordingly, in the case of an unforeseeably unfavourable interpretation of the 
scope of an intellectual property right, or of an exception to that right, a right-holder may be 
entitled to rely upon Art 17(2) in objecting to that interpretation.    
 
A further potential situation in which Art 17(2) may have an impact arises as a result of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ recognition that Art 1, Protocol 1 will, to some extent, 
require the establishment of enforcement mechanisms that allow property right-holders to 
seek redress for interferences with their property rights. This will be the case, even where the 
interference in question has been committed by a third party.
53
 Art 17(2) may also have 
relevance where an EU or national authority abolishes, or curtails the scope of, existing 
intellectual property rights. In such a case, there would be a clear interference with an 
existing possession which would only be permissible if justifiable under the Charter. 
Consider, for example, a decision taken by an EU or national authority to reduce the term of 
protection of an intellectual property right
54
 or to introduce a new limitation upon an existing 
intellectual property right. Such decisions would undoubtedly fall within the scope of Art 
17(2), although they would be likely to be considered as ‘uses’ rather than ‘deprivations’.
55
  
This potential impact of Art 17(2) may, at first sight, appear to place a significant obstacle in 
the path of balanced policy-making. However, it is important to bear in mind that decision-
makers are granted a very wide margin of appreciation in determining the necessity of 
interfering with the enjoyment of possessions in the general interest under Art 1, Protocol 1. 
It can be suggested that this deferential approach ought to continue to apply under Art 17(2).
 
56
                                                            
52 Article 7 ECHR states that:  
‘(1) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a 
heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 
(2) This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the 
time it was committed, was criminal according to the general law recognised by civilised nations’. 
The principle of legality requires that laws be sufficiently clearly formulated to be reasonably predictable in 
their operation, so that it is possible for individuals to regulate their conduct in line with the ‘law’. For 
application of the principle, see Kafkaris v Cyprus (2009) 49 EHRR 35; SW & CR v UK (1996) 21 EHRR 363. 
In the intellectual property context, see Scarlet Extended SA v Société Belge des auteurs, compositeurs et 
éditeurs (SABAM) (C-70/10) (AG Cruz Villalón); Opinion of 14 April 2011. 
53 See Sovtransavto Holding v Ukraine (2004) 38 EHRR 44; Broniowski v. Poland (2004) EHRR 1, 56 (Grand 
Chamber); Iatridis v Greece (2000) 30 EHRR 97; Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy (1999) EHRR 73, 90–92 (Grand 
Chamber). Helfer has described this broader understanding of the impact of the property guarantee as the 
‘enforcement paradigm’ for human rights intervention in intellectual property law. See L Helfer, ‘The New 
Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights’ in P. Torremans (ed), 
Intellectual Property & Human Rights, (Kluwer, 2008), 25, 51, noting that the maintenance of effective 
enforcement mechanisms is also a requirement of TRIPS.  
54 The provision of transitional protection for existing right-holders may, of course, remove any issue relating to 
the property guarantee. 
55 The case law from the European Court of Human Rights is useful in the context. As noted in Lithgow v 
United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 324, ‘deprivation’ will only occur where all rights in the property are 
extinguished. Furthermore, as noted in Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 85 and Baner v. 
Sweden (1989) 60 DR 125, de facto deprivation will only occur where an interference with the rights of the 
property owner are so extensive as effectively to deprive the owner of the property, even where he, she or it 
retains the formal title. 
56 L Helfer, “The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights” in P 
Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property & Human Rights, (Kluwer, 2008), 25, 51-52. Helfer has stated that an 
expansive view of the role of the ECHR, under which the European Court of Human Rights would have broader 
powers to rule on cases involving ‘balancing’ IP protection with other rights such as freedom of expression and 
privacy, would not be in line with the spirit of Art 1 Protocol 1, or with current ECHR jurisprudence 
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Conclusion 
 
The admission of intellectual property to the category of EU fundamental rights is clearly 
related to broader trends towards ‘propertisation’ in intellectual property law. Peukert has 
noted that descriptions of intellectual property as a fundamental right underpin a ‘self-
sufficient property logic’ that has developed in intellectual property law.
57
 He suggests that 
recent ECJ jurisprudence in this area has aligned itself with this ‘property logic’, through 
acceptance of the notion that maintaining the highest possible level of intellectual property 
protection is always desirable.
58
 In such a climate, it is not surprising that advocates of 
stronger intellectual property rights have already sought to rely upon the fundamental rights 
status of intellectual property rights. In this concluding section, we briefly consider a number 
of such claims.   
 
An example of such an argument can be seen in the submission of the Motion Picture 
Association (MPA) to a recent United Kingdom consultation exercise on a proposal to 
expand the scope of certain copyright exceptions and limitations.
59
 The MPA’s submission 
reminded national authorities that: 
  
“[I]n weighing the various proposals, it should be borne in mind that copyright is a 
fundamental right...”
60
 
On the face of it, this statement is accurate. Copyright undoubtedly falls within the ambit of 
Art 17(2).
61
 However, in the context of the consultation, the statement appears to be intended 
to dissuade the United Kingdom authorities from expanding the scope of the statutory 
copyright exceptions. It implies that copyright’s status as a fundamental right militates 
against the liberalisation of the existing regime of exceptions. This, as we have learned from 
a closer analysis of the jurisprudence on Art1, Prot 1, is not really accurate. The case-law 
indicates that, as long as a legislator acts legally (in the Strasbourg sense), does nothing that 
is manifestly disproportionate and applies a procedure that is fair, it will have a high degree 
of discretion in framing laws ‘in the general interest’, even where such laws interfere with the 
enjoyment of private ‘possessions’. It is important that law-makers understand the true scope 
of Art 17(2) and are not deterred from serving the general interest through misplaced fear of 
committing a violation of fundamental rights. 
 
Rhetorical references to intellectual property’s status as a fundamental right are not only to be 
found in submissions by lobbyists. They have also recently begun to appear in arguments 
advanced before the EU courts. Eva-Maria Painer is a reference to the ECJ from  Austria in 
                                                            
57 A Peurket, ‘Intellectual Property as an End in Itself?’ [2011] European Intellectual Property Review 67, 69-
70. 
58 Nonetheless, there are also some recent cases in which the ECJ has not necessarily taken a ‘maximalist’ 
approach to IP protection. See, for example, (C-49-09P) Lego Juris v OHIM [2010] ECR 0000 [43]-[48]; (C-
236/08 to C-238/08) Google/Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR 0000 [75]-[98]; (C-428/08) Monsanto/Cefetra [2010] 
ECR 0000, [43]-[50]. 
59 UK-IPO, Taking Forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property – Second Stage Consultation on 
Copyright (2009).  
60 At the time of writing, the submissions have not been published by the UK-IPO. The submission of the MPA 
is on file with the authors. 
61 See also Art 27, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed at the General Assembly of 
the United Nations on 10 December 1948. 
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which a claimant photographer argues that failure to protect ‘portrait photographs’ in national 
copyright law would violate Article 17(2).
62
 No clear justification for this argument is 
provided and, with the benefit of a careful assessment of Art 17(2)’s true scope, it can be seen 
that the claim is unsustainable. As noted above, as long as procedure is fair and conclusions 
are not arbitrary or manifestly disproportionate, there will be no relevant ‘interference’ where 
a national court has simply determined the previously uncertain boundaries of a national 
property right. The claimant’s argument in Painer shares the same flaws as those of the 
applicants in Anheuser-Busch and Dima. 
 
In an earlier section of this chapter, we quoted the recital to the Enforcement Directive 
(IPRED), which claims Art 17(2) as a justification for legislative intervention. The form of 
words employed in that recital was subsequently repeated verbatim in the preamble to the ill-
fated draft Directive on criminal enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRED 2): 
 
‘This Directive respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In particular, this Directive 
seeks to ensure full respect for intellectual property, in accordance with Article 17(2) 
of the Charter.’
 63
 
These words suggest that IPRED2’s harmonisation and expansion of criminal sanctions in the 
field of intellectual property law is motivated by a requirement to act ‘in accordance with’ 
Art 17(2). We have noted above that Art 1, Protocol 1 requires parties to the ECHR to 
implement systems permitting the enforcement of property rights and it has been suggested 
that this principle will extend to intellectual property rights under Art 17(2). Nevertheless, it 
cannot reasonably be suggested that Art 17(2) requires the introduction of any specific form 
of enforcement mechanism. While criminal sanctions may be the only permissible response 
to certain violations of fundamental rights,
64
 there is nothing to suggest that such sanctions 
are mandatory in the case of intellectual property infringements. In this instance, it is difficult 
to escape the conclusion that the recital’s reference to fundamental rights is little more than 
an attempt to bolster the draft legislation’s claim to legitimacy through reference to 
fundamental norms. The increasing prevalence of such ill-founded rhetoric is disturbing. It is 
not only misleading, but may eventually lead to scepticism of all claims based on 
fundamental rights in the sphere of intellectual property law. The more things that are 
claimed as being ‘fundamental’ or ‘human’ rights, the greater the risk that rights language 
will become less persuasive. It is accordingly important that claims concerning the scope and 
effect of Art 17(2) are advanced, and scrutinised, carefully. 
 
                                                            
62 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH C-145/10 (AG Trstenjak); Opinion of 12th April 2011.  
63 Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Convention on criminal measures 
aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights COM (2006) 168 final, 26th April 2006, recital 
12. 
64 See, for example, X & Y v The Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 235; MC v Bulgaria (2005) 40 EHRR 459; A v 
UK (1999) 27 EHRR 611; Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28; Siliadin v France [2006] EHRR 16. 
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